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Abstract 
Experimentation represents today a ‘hot’ topic in computing. If 
experiments made with the support of computers, such as computer 
simulations, have received increasing attention from philosophers of 
science and technology, questions such as “what does it mean to do 
experiments in computer science and engineering and what are their 
benefits?” emerged only recently as central in the debate over the 
disciplinary status of computing. In this work I argue that an 
extension of the traditional notion of controlled experiment is 
necessary to give reasons for the different experimental practices 
encountered in computing and using computing tools, such as 
computer simulations. Taking inspiration from the discussion on 
exploratory experimentation in the philosophy of science – 
experimentation that is not theory-driven – I introduce the idea of 
explorative experiments that can contribute to enlarge the debate 
about the nature and role of experimental methods in computing. 
Moreover, I stress that, when experiments are explorative, control 
should be intended in a posteriori form, in opposition to the a priori 
form that usually takes place in traditional experimental contexts.  
Experiments and computing: Not only 
simulations 
Experimentation represents today a ‘hot’ topic in computing. 
Not only experiments made with the support of computers, 
such as computer simulations, play an essential role in every 
domain of science and technology, but also questions such as 
“what does it mean to make experiments in computer science 
and engineering and what are their benefits?” have recently 
taken a center stage in the debate over the disciplinary status 
of computing. However, if the experimental capabilities of 
computer simulations have received increasing attention from 
philosophers of science, the same attention has not been 
devoted to analyze the notion of experiment in the realm of 
computing. In this work I argue that an extension of the 
traditional notion of controlled experiment is necessary to 
give reasons for the different experimental practices 
encountered in computing and using computing tools, such as 
computer simulations. I rely in particular on examples from 
autonomous robotics, an area of computer engineering where 
the interplay between the scientific and engineering aspects of 
computing is strong. 
 It is undoubtedly evident that science has entered what has 
been called the ‘age of computer simulation’ (Winsberg, 
2010); the massive use of computer simulations in virtually 
every domain of science has drawn attention to their 
epistemological justification: if computer simulations started 
as tools to build tractable models for solving the equations 
provided by theories, nowadays their role expanded and, 
besides dealing with the construction of models of greater and 
greater complexity, computer simulations can be used to 
increase the exploration opportunities. This is in accordance 
with the idea of ‘modeling from above’ (Fox Keller, 2003) 
and ‘modeling from the ground up’ (MacLeod and 
Nersessian, 2013), where the theoretical model supporting the 
simulation is under construction and shaped by the simulation 
results themselves. Accordingly, a different relation between 
theory and experiment emerges, where the latter actively 
participates in the settling of the former, instead of aiming 
only at testing or rejecting the theory itself. 
 Recently the experimental properties of computer 
simulations have been examined, and philosophers have 
begun to consider in what sense, if any, computer simulations 
are experiments (see (Winsberg, 2013) for a detailed analysis 
of this debate). Positions range from a full acceptance of the 
identity thesis (“Computer simulation studies are literally 
instances of experiments”) to its rejection in different degrees. 
Computer simulations can be used as experiments in the case 
in which the purposes of simulation and those of experiment 
coincide, but they are not necessarily experiments: it is 
perfectly plausible to have computer simulations at work that 
do not have any experimental purpose (think for example of 
simulations adopted for didactical purposes).  
 The possibility of using simulations as experiments resides 
in the ability (and in the necessity) they both possess of 
controlling the features under investigation, thus 
implementing the original idea of experiment as a controlled 
experience. The source of credibility for the models used in 
the different cases of simulations as experiments greatly 
varies: if the case in which the credentials are provided by the 
theoretical ancestors on which simulations are based is not 
problematic, the ‘modeling from above’ or ‘from the ground 
up’ practices require an epistemological justification for their 
use. Indeed, the use of computer simulations also in those 
fields that do not have secure theoretical foundations and/or in 
which data are sparse has reshaped the way experimental 
results are considered reliable. In these contexts experiments 
(in the form of computer simulations) cannot be considered as 
pure controlled experiences anymore, but are better conceived 
as explorations, where the theoretical background is 
progressively shaped by simulation results.  
 When moving from the analysis of experiments made with 
computing (simulations) to experiments made in computing, a 
closer look on whether and to what extent the traditional 
experimental protocol can be applied to computing provides 
evidence that the same explorative approach used in computer 
simulations is already at work in this context, even if it is not 
yet properly conceptualized. Taking inspiration from the 
discussion on exploratory experimentation in the philosophy 
of science – experimentation that is not theory-driven – and 
from the broad notion of directly action-guiding experiment 
(Hansson, 2016), I advance the idea of explorative 
experiments that could contribute to enlarge the debate about 
the nature and role of experimental methods in computing. By 
investigating autonomous robotics in particular, it is evident 
that the traditional notion of experimentation cannot be 
always applied as such to computer engineering experimental 
practices and that the notion of explorative experiment is a 
good candidate to be considered. I suggest, moreover, that, 
when experiments are explorative, control should be intended 
in a posteriori form, in opposition to the a priori form that 
usually takes place in traditional experimental contexts.  
 In general an experiment is a set of observations and 
actions, performed in a controlled context, to test theories and 
to provide a basis for scientific knowledge (Hacking, 1983; 
Franklin, 1986; Radder, 2003). Control, intended as an active 
manipulation of the phenomena under investigation where the 
choice of the factors to be controlled is critical, is usually 
considered a central feature of experimentation so that 
experiments are also labelled ‘controlled experiments’. By 
explorative experiments I mean a form of investigation of 
novel and interesting ideas or techniques without the typical 
constraints of rigorous experimental methodologies. These are 
experiments that are driven by the desire of investigating the 
realm of possibilities pertaining to the functioning of an 
artefact and its interaction with the environment in the 
absence of a proper theory or theoretical background. So 
hypotheses cannot be clearly stated and, even if the ultimate 
goal is to acquire knowledge about the performance of the 
artefacts under investigation and to find out proper concepts 
to formulate possible regularities, the experimenter is not in 
full control of the experimental setting due to the 
impossibility of anticipating all the plausible outcomes. 
Therefore, when experiments are explorative, control should 
be intended in a posteriori form, in opposition to the a priori 
form of the traditional experimental contexts. If in the latter 
experimental factors are in control of the experimenter in a 
sort of anticipation of the scenario to be tested, in the former 
the possibility of full anticipation disappears and control is in 
part carried out after the artefact has been inserted into 
society. This is in line with the crisis of the traditional notion 
of experimental control that has been recently evidenced by 
Peter Kroes (2016) in his analysis of experiments with new 
technologies in socio-technical systems. The traditional 
control paradigm is based on two assumptions: the 
experimenter is not part of the system on which the 
experiment is performed and (s)he is in control of the 
independent variables and of the experimental set-up. 
Accordingly, the experimenter is able to intervene both by 
changing these variables to evaluate their influence on the 
dependent ones and by varying the experimental set-up. This 
traditional control paradigm becomes problematic, and a 
consequent shift in the notions of intervention and control is 
observed, when considering new technologies as socio-
technical systems, namely as hybrid systems composed of 
natural objects, technical artefacts, human actors, and social 
entities. The idea of controlling the experimental system from 
a center of command and control that is outside the system 
becomes highly problematic because the distinction between 
the experimental system and its environment is critical and the 
environment is complex due to the co-presence of technical 
artefacts and natural and social elements. Hence controlling 
these systems not only involves technical artefacts and social 
elements, but also problematizes the drawing of the line 
between the experimental system and its environment. 
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